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Abstract
This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to
ex post assessments of the same regulations.  Our review of more than two dozen
environmental and occupational safety regulations indicates that ex ante estimates of total
(direct) costs have tended to exceed actuals.  We find this to be true of 12 of the 25 rules in
our data set, while for only 6 were the ex ante estimates too low.  The overestimation of total
costs is often due to errors in the quantity of emission reductions achieved by the rule which,
in turn, suggest that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated.  The quantity errors are
driven by both baseline and compliance issues.  At least for EPA and OSHA rules,
overestimation of per-unit abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation.  In
contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, per-unit costs are consistently
overestimated.
Much of the overestimation can be attributed to technical innovations unanticipated at
the time the rule is issued, and to quantity errors.  In addition, several methodological and
procedural explanations also apply: changes in the regulation after the cost estimate is
prepared, use of maximum cost estimates, and asymmetric error correction.
Since a number of environmental laws encourage the development of cost estimates
that reflect a maximum rather than a mean, regulatory agencies could issue a "best estimate"
along with the statutorily preferred cost estimate.  Likewise, they could ensure that rule
changes made in the course of the regulatory development process are manifest in revised cost
estimates.  Indeed, discovering how and when to adjust ex ante estimates provides the
strongest possible justification for more credible ex post studies--a research activity that
merits greater emphasis.
Key Words: environmental costs, costing accuracy, innovation and regulation
JEL Classification Numbers: D82, K23, Q28iii
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1
II. Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 3
III. Defining Regulatory Cost Estimates ............................................................................ 7
IV. Results ........................................................................................................................13
V. Discussion ..................................................................................................................16
1. Technological Innovation  ....................................................................................16
2. Quantity Errors: Baseline and Compliance Issues ................................................18
3. Uncounted Cost Reductions Achieved during the Regulatory Review and
Public Comment Periods ......................................................................................19
4. Estimating Maxima Rather Than Means  ..............................................................20
5. Asymmetric Correction of Errors of Estimation ...................................................22
VI. Conclusions ................................................................................................................22
Appendix A: Summary of Case Studies ..............................................................................25
Appendix B: Description of Cases ......................................................................................29
References ..........................................................................................................................37
List of Tables
Table 1. A Taxonomy of Costs of Environmental Regulation ............................................. 8
Table 2. Cost Estimation: Some Hypothetical Cases ..........................................................11
Table 3. Case Study Results ..............................................................................................141
ON THE ACCURACY OF REGULATORY COST ESTIMATES
Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern,
and Peter Nelson1
I.  INTRODUCTION
Reflecting increasing concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates of environmental
and occupational safety regulations, the Office of Management and Budget (1998) recently
observed that, "industry representatives and think tanks assert…that [government] estimates
understate costs…while public interest groups and Federal agencies generally assert…that
[government] estimates overstate costs."  A great deal of debate has focused on the normative
question of how (if at all) cost information should be used in regulatory decision-making.
Curiously, though, beyond the occasional anecdotes, little serious attention has been devoted
to assessing the overall accuracy of the cost information that is generated by and available to
regulators.  Is there evidence of systematic errors  in these so-called ex ante cost estimates?  If
so, are the estimates too high or too low?  What lessons are suggested for reform of
rulemaking processes?
There is an interesting ideological divide in the types of evidence brought to bear in
addressing these questions.  Those who believe costs are underestimated often have in mind
the costs of an entire program or legislative initiative.  Superfund is Exhibit A.  Critics argue
that the program, originally designed to clean up Love Canal and a few other big sites,
expanded its scope and became a "behemoth, towering over American environmental policy"
(Cairncross, 1993).  Other critics have focused on the discrepancy between the initial
objectives of U.S. environmental laws, e.g., the Clean Air Act (1970), and the progress toward
meeting those objectives (Downing and Brady, 1980).  The National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, for example, were originally thought to be achievable within a decade.  Yet, even
today we still are still unsure how, when, or even if the original goals will be met.
Another argument made by those who believe costs are understated is that the ex ante
estimates leave out some important cost categories, e.g., regulatory-induced job losses, claims
on management attention, discouraged investment, and retarded innovation.  Dynamic general
equilibrium analyses, which attempt to account for the indirect effects of price increases in
one sector of the U.S. economy on purchasing and production decisions throughout the
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economy, suggest that the long run social costs of regulation exceed direct compliance
expenditures by 30-50 percent (Hazilla and Kopp, 1990; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990).
However, such models are not generally used in analyses of individual regulations.
In contrast to such concerns, those who believe costs are overestimated prefer to look
at the direct costs of complying with specific regulations.  The most often cited example
involves reductions of sulfur dioxide emissions mandated under the Clean Air Act
Amendments (1990).  In that case, the huge discrepancy between the early industry cost
estimates (as high as $1500 per ton) and recent allowance prices (currently about $150 per
ton, up from $75 per ton in 1997), is taken as evidence of a problem of government
overestimates (e.g., Browner, 1997).  Particularly in the environmental community,
unforeseen innovations are credited with driving down the costs.
In this paper we avoid the broader and more contentious question of whether
environmental programs grow far beyond their initial legislative intent: That issue is more
difficult to deal with, in part because of the challenge of even stating the question in an
empirically testable way.  We also avoid the question of indirect costs, largely because of the
inability to obtain ex post (or ex ante) cost information for individual regulations.  Although
claims that regulatory costs are overestimated do not always distinguish between agency and
industry estimates, we consider industry estimates only as possible influences on agency
forecasts, rather than as per se estimates of ex ante costs.
While finding bias in the cost estimates from industry (or environmental) sources is
perhaps to be expected, the existence of systematic errors in cost estimates prepared by the
regulatory agency itself has potentially significant implications.  If costs are regularly
overestimated, thereby making potential new regulations appear more costly, rulemakings
would generally favor the selection of less stringent emission control options (and,
conversely, if costs are consistently underestimated).  Large discrepancies would lead not
only to bad decisions, but would misrepresent the true burden of regulation on the society and
undermine the public confidence in the regulatory process.  Not surprisingly, the belief held
by many environmentalists that costs tend to be overestimated (and benefits underestimated)
by regulatory agencies underlies many of their concerns about allowing cost information, and
particularly benefit-cost analysis, to play a prominent role in regulatory decisions.  The only
sure way of assessing systematic errors in regulatory cost estimates is to compare ex ante cost
estimates, prepared at the time the regulation is issued, with actual costs, determined ex post.
However, ex post studies of the costs of regulation are quite scarce in the literature on
regulatory policy assessment.  Rulemaking agencies have neither a legislative mandate nor a
bureaucratic incentive to perform such analyses.2  In fact, the conduct of ex post studies may
detract from an agency's mission not only by using limited resources, but by generating
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outcomes that may prove embarrassing.  Not surprisingly, most detailed ex post studies have
been carried out by independent researchers.
While uncommon, some interesting and useful ex post estimates of the cost of
environmental health and safety regulation have been prepared.  In our examination of these
studies we find evidence of both underestimation and overestimation, although overestimation
appears in our sample to be more common.  At least for national regulations in the U.S., the
overestimation of total costs is often caused by forecasting errors in the quantity of emission
reductions achieved by the rule.  This, in turn, suggests that the benefits of the rule may also
be overstated.  In addition, much of the overestimation can be attributed to technical
innovations unanticipated at the time the rule is issued.  However, we also find that costs can
be mis-estimated--and usually overestimated--for other reasons.  Sometimes there are simply
errors of analysis.  Sometimes the cost estimate is not intended to be an accurate estimate of
costs, but an upper bound of what the costs could be.  And sometimes the regulation as
implemented is not the same as the regulatory proposal for which the cost estimate was
prepared.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section II reviews the limited literature on the
subject.  Section III defines some key terms and presents an analytical framework for thinking
about ex ante/ex post comparisons.  Section IV surveys the results of those comparisons.
Section V develops some possible explanations for our findings.  Section VI presents our
conclusions and directions for further research.
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW
It is a little surprising that so many observers believe that regulatory cost estimates
overestimate the true costs of regulation, considering that costs of other government activities,
especially procurement and public investment, are usually thought to be underestimated.
"Government cost overruns" are famously the staple of headlines and talk shows, whether the
government in question is local (stadiums or convention centers), state (expressways) or
national (defense projects).  The accuracy of ex ante cost estimates in government contracting
has been studied more thoroughly than in rulemaking and is therefore a good place to start.
Several historical accounts of public investment projects have found government cost
overruns to be deliberate and strategic.  Caro (1974), for example, documents the legendary
practices of Robert Moses, bureaucrat extraordinaire, whose public works projects
transformed New York City (and State) between the 1920s and 1960s.  Moses is said to have
routinely and purposely underestimated the costs of major public works projects in order to
gain quick approval.  Once construction got underway he would re-estimate costs (usually
multiplying them several-fold) and seek supplemental funding for the partially completed
projects.  According to Caro, Moses was such a powerful and persuasive figure that he was
able repeatedly to sell ridiculously low project cost estimates to gullible legislators, who were
then committed to the project and later too embarrassed to admit their gullibility.  An even
more striking example is provided by McCullough's (1978) account of the disastrous French
attempt to build an ocean-connecting canal in Panama in the 1880s.  Costs were honestlyHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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underestimated initially because French engineers, misled by their Suez experience, failed
utterly to understand the magnitude of their task.  As the true scope of the project became
known, however, the leaders of the quasi-public corporation established to build and operate
the canal refused to revise the costs or acknowledge the difficulties, for fear of causing a
collapse in the stock price, leading to the financial embarrassment of the early backers of the
project, especially its biggest backer, the French government.
More systematic attempts to analyze cost overruns have also focused on strategic
explanations.  These efforts have been concentrated in the study of defense contracting, where
several analytical models have been developed to explain what Quirk and Terasawa (1984)
call the "pervasive and massive" cost escalation in defense projects and in "first-of-a-kind"
projects in the private sector.  The explanations have focused on the difference between the
competitive environment in which the cost estimate is made and the principal-agent
environment that applies subsequently.  For many years it was common for the Defense
Department to issue cost-plus fixed fee contracts, which create obvious moral hazard
problems.  However, it has also been shown that inefficiencies and hence a tendency toward
cost escalation can arise whenever perfect monitoring is not possible and contractors are risk-
averse, regardless of the form of contract (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Weitzman, 1980).
A non-defense example of strategic cost underestimation can be found in federal
support for local transit projects, which one observer attributes largely to the perverse
incentives in the funding mechanism.  In the eight U.S. cities examined Pickrell (1992) found
that local officials "grossly" overestimated rail transit ridership and underestimated rail
construction costs and operating expenses, thereby favoring large projects over less capital-
intensive options.  He concluded that such large errors were not simply technical mistakes but
rather arise from the peculiar nature of federal transportation subsidies which favor capital-
intensive projects such as fixed rail over buses and other more flexible systems.
Researchers have also found non-strategic reasons for cost escalation in government
contracting.  For example, Terasawa, Quirk and Womar (1984) show that cost escalation
results under conditions of "turbulence," (mean-preserving increases in the variance of the
production schedule).  Such conditions are common in military procurement, since the annual
defense budget is subject to frequent alteration in Congress.
Another source of nonstrategic systematic error is the "winner's curse," which can
produce cost underestimates even without turbulence and even when analysts are trying to
provide honest estimates of cost (Quirk and Terasawa, 1986).  The authors assume a project
consisting of components each chosen from a menu of possibilities, with a cost estimate
attached to each possible component.  Even if the costs of individual components are
estimated without bias, the cost of the overall project is more likely to be underestimated
because the individual component cost estimates are used to select the components of the
combined project.  Those components with underestimated costs are the ones more likely to
make up the final project.  The greater the uncertainty, furthermore, the larger the overall
underestimation.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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Finally, it is worth noting that cost underestimation is not inevitable in public
investments.  In a comparison of realized and forecast construction costs of federal water
projects, Haveman (1972) shows substantial variation and a tendency toward overestimating
costs.  He attributes the overestimation to conceptual errors and inadequate forecasts of
exogenous factors such as stream flows, with no reference to strategic bias by the estimators.
This quick survey of cost escalation in public investments may seem remote from our
concerns about estimating the cost of regulation, but it offers at least three useful insights and
one puzzle, we believe.  First, it calls attention to the very great difference between the
cooperative game being played by the agency and its contractors and the non-cooperative
game (usually) being played by the agency and its regulatees.  In the former case the parties
may differ on many things, but they share a common interest in expanding the size of the
program and in keeping public attention away from escalating costs.  In the latter case, the
regulatory agency may desire larger programs, but the regulatees usually do not, leading often
to public complaints when costs are underestimated.
Second, for those regulatory programs that are also public investments, such as
Superfund cleanup expenditures or federal subsidies for publicly-owned wastewater treatment
facilities, costs are more likely to be underestimated than for other regulatory programs (CBO,
1994).  Third, we see no reason why the nonstrategic explanations for cost underestimation in
investment projects--cost turbulence and selection bias--should not in principle apply to
regulatory cost estimation as well.  Finally, the puzzle: If advances in technology operate so
powerfully and conspicuously to reduce costs of regulation, why aren't those same forces
more visible in producing pleasant cost surprises among public investments?
Unlike the case of public investments, no analytical models have been developed to
explain ex ante cost estimation by regulatory bodies.3  There is, however, a less formal
literature that analyzes the procedures used in agency rulemaking and points out problem
areas that can lead to over- or underestimates.  Thus, Higgins and Buc (1997) argue that
inadequacies in EPA methods bias the cost estimate towards a cost overestimate.  In
particular, they assert that in addition to the failure to consider innovation or cost-reductions
through learning by doing, EPA analyses generally fail to acknowledge the overhead or
                                               
3 However, there have been efforts to develop models to explain cost estimates by regulated firms.  For example
Kwerel (1977) has argued that under an effluent fee policy firms have an incentive to underestimate compliance
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circumstances regulation might be advantageous to at least some firms in the industry, in which case strategic
behavior would very like call for a cost underestimate.  Some writers have suggested that firms have sought
regulation to "raise rivals' costs" (Salop and Scheffman, 1983).  Perhaps an example is provided by du Pont's
seemingly enlightened response to CFC regulation.  Since it owned patents on a number of promising
substitutes, the company may have viewed the CFC phaseout as an opportunity to increase market share
(Morrisette, 1989).  Yet, Hammitt (1997) still found that costs were still overestimated, at least in the early
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"fixed" nature of certain costs, treating them as marginal to the environmental regulation
when they probably are not.
Fraas and Lutter (1996) also find fault with the cost estimates produced by the EPA.
However, they believe that costs are more likely to be underestimated because of errors of
omission during the rulemaking process.  In three of the five RCRA rules examined by the
authors, the EPA failed to include the costs of an important waste stream consisting of
"nonhazardous" toxic wastes, such as batteries and fluorescent lamps.  These wastes were
excluded from the cost estimate because of uncertainty whether they would be subject to the
rule, as well as a lack of data at the time of the analysis was conducted.  However, the rules
were later judged to apply to these wastes.  A subsequent rule exempted these wastes at an
estimated savings of $200 million, an amount the authors infer to be a cost that should have
been in the original rule.
The other strand of literature that is of interest consists of a handful of papers, like the
present one, that attempt to compile broad-based assessments of the accuracy of
environmental or occupational regulations affecting the private sector.  The earliest study we
are aware of was conducted by the consulting firm Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett (PHB, 1980),
which compared sector-level capital expenditures for pollution control to those originally
forecast by EPA.  Part of the study also looked at the accuracy of industry forecasts.  PHB
found that EPA tended to overestimate capital costs more often than they underestimated
them, with forecasts ranging from 26 percent below to 156 percent above reported
expenditures.  For industry the overestimates were somewhat larger.  Unfortunately, the
reliance on aggregate data raises many issues about the interpretation of the results.4
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, 1995) conducted a wide-ranging review
of the methods OSHA uses to examine hazard control options and estimate regulatory
impacts.  Included in their review are six independent studies containing ex ante/ex post cost
comparisons, all of which are included in the present study (see Table 2).  OTA found that
most attention is placed on so-called "conventional" control measures rather than on new
technology.  They argue that "such bias is not surprising, given the 'feasibility demonstration'
orientation of the agency's rulemaking logic and the need for control technology assumptions
capable of standing up well under 'substantial evidence' scrutiny by the courts later.  But this
narrowed focus leaves a significant gap in the vision of the potentially available control
options that OSHA can bring to the policymaking debate."  Overall, the OTA report
concluded that "the actual compliance response that was observed included advanced or
innovative control measures that had not been emphasized in the rulemaking analyses, and the
actual cost burden proved to be considerably less than what OSHA had estimated" (page 10).
                                               
4 The PHB (1980) study is based, in part, on the Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditure Survey (PACE)
collected by the Bureau of the Census (1972-1995).  Although the PACE data are neither regulation-specific nor
disaggregated beyond the environmental receiving medium, PHB argued that they were suitable for at least
rough ex ante/ex post comparisons of the early period of environmental regulation.  However, this is highly
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A recent study by Goodstein and Hodges (1997) of a dozen EPA and OSHA
regulations finds that most pollution control programs turn out to be less costly than had been
estimated beforehand.  They find that "reducing pollution emissions at the source. . . is almost
certain to be (substantially) cheaper than we think it will be."  They conclude that the
overestimates result from new technologies that are developed in response to the regulations:
"when industry is required to lower pollution output, it usually doesn't just slap a new filter on
an existing process; it often invents new technology."  Our approach differs from that of
Goodstein and Hodges in several ways.  First, as Squitieri (1997) has noted, Goodstein and
Hodges do not grapple with key baseline issues which can affect the quantity of emission
reductions actually induced by the regulation.  Second, their conclusions rest, in part, on
comparisons with ex ante studies conducted by industry.  Since strategic behavior on the part
of industry may lead them to overstate costs, the present study focuses exclusively on ex ante
cost estimates developed by the regulatory agencies.  Third, Goodstein and Hodges include in
their list not only comparisons of ex ante and ex post costs, but also comparisons of an ex ante
estimate with a later ex ante estimate.  We limit ourselves to the former.
III.   DEFINING REGULATORY COST ESTIMATES
Although the notion of "regulatory cost estimation" may appear straightforward, in
actuality it is anything but.  The hard part is to identify just what it is that ought to be
compared.  After all, comparing costs ex ante and ex post means more than just determining
what is spent; care is also required to ensure comparability in what is being purchased.  To
shed light on the conceptual issues we begin by asking what do we mean by "cost"?  What do
we mean by "regulation"?  And what do we mean by "estimates"?
Cost.  To determine the cost (or benefits) of a regulation, one must compare conditions
in a world with the regulation to conditions in a world without it.  To produce ex ante
estimates, both the "with" and the "without" scenarios must be modeled; they cannot be
observed.  For the ex post calculation, the world with the regulation is observed, but the
counterfactual is not.  To produce an ex post estimate, one must determine the actual outcome
empirically, and compare it to a hypothetical baseline based on the status quo ante.  The
construction of baselines is one of the most difficult and contentious parts of regulatory cost
analysis.  In other words, regulatory cost estimates can hardly escape being to some degree
hypothetical whether they are made ex post or ex ante.  The definition of baselines is therefore
in some degree arbitrary, depending as it does on the analysts' beliefs on what would have
happened without the regulation.
To an economist, the cost of a good or service is the maximum value of the opportunities
foregone in obtaining that good or service.5  Table 1 reproduces with minor alterations a
taxonomy of the costs of environmental regulation developed by Jaffe et al. (1995) moving
from the most to the least obvious.  We have added a column to the right, indicating whether
                                               
5 More precisely, the cost of a regulation is equal to "the change in consumer and producer surpluses associated
with the regulation and with any price and/or income changes that may result" (Cropper and Oates, 1992, p. 721).Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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costs in each category are typically part of ex ante estimates developed by regulatory agencies.
The list is topped by the capital and operating expenditures associated with regulatory
compliance.  Such activities are typically carried out and paid for by the private sector,
although some activities fall on state and local governments (e.g., drinking water) and some on
the federal government (e.g. compliance expenditures of TVA and Bonneville Power
Administration).  As shown, such capital and operating costs are routinely considered in
regulatory cost analyses.
Table 1:  A Taxonomy of Costs of Environmental Regulation
Cost category Counted in
RIA?
DIRECT COSTS
Private Sector Compliance Expenditures
Capital Yes
Operating and maintenance Yes
Public Sector Compliance Expenditures
Capital Yes
Operating and maintenance Yes
Government Administration of Environmental Statutes and Regulations
Monitoring Rarely
Enforcement Rarely
Other Direct Costs (including negative costs)
Legal and Other Transactional Sometimes
Shifted Management Focus No
Disrupted Production No
Waiting time Sometimes
Intermedia pollutant effects Sometimes
Other natural resource effects Sometimes
Changes in maintenance requirements of other equipment Sometimes
Worker Health Sometimes









Source: Adapted from Jaffe et al. (1995).Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
9
A few other cost categories are occasionally addressed in the ex ante analyses.  Some of
these categories are shown under "other direct costs."  They are particularly noticeable in
analyses of automobile regulations, and they often show up as negative costs.  Thus, an
important element in the estimates of the cost of standards for new motor vehicles is the
improved fuel economy and reduced maintenance requirements attributable to the introduction
of computerized fuel injection, a technology that provides many engine benefits besides lower
emissions (USEPA, 1993).  The cost analysis for the vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M)
program also claims large fuel economy benefits resulting from better engine performance
(USEPA, 1992).  In a similar vein, the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) for the regulation
to limit lead in drinking water credits the regulation with reducing mineral deposits in pipes,
thereby lowering maintenance expenses.  Not all the "other" costs counted in RIAs are
negative.  For example, the I/M cost analysis counts the cost of motorists waiting in queues at
testing stations.  Also, adverse effects of regulation on workers have occasionally appeared in
RIAs.  Similarly, some pesticide regulations have led to substitution of compounds that are
more acutely toxic but less environmentally persistent than those they replaced.
In contrast, the other categories in the cost taxonomy, including government
administration of environmental statutes and regulations, some of the other direct costs,
general equilibrium effects, and transition costs are not generally considered in regulatory cost
estimates.  For one thing, often it only makes sense to speak of these costs with respect to
regulation in the aggregate rather than for specific regulations.  The cost of administration of
environmental statutes is usually omitted because of a joint cost allocation problem; besides,
the government's costs are thought to be small relative to those of the private sector.  As for
the other costs, the principal reason they are excluded is the lack of credible information or
insufficient analytical resources to apply whatever data or models do exist.  Thus, additional
management resources or disrupted production is plausibly important, but no ex ante
estimates have been prepared.6
The general equilibrium effects of environmental regulation are likely to be important,
but are likewise virtually impossible to examine empirically.  Computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models have not been tested against real-world outcomes, and may be untestable.
Builders of these models content themselves with observing that the input parameters are
reasonable and based on empirical data.  Regardless, for most individual regulations focused
                                               
6 There have been some attempts to measure these costs ex post, at least indirectly, such as Gray and Shadbegian
(1993) and Joshi et al. (1997) in the steel industry, and most recently, Morgenstern et al. (1998a) for a set of 11
industries.  These studies estimate cost functions to examine the effect of reported abatement expenditures (as
measured by PACE) on total cost.  The other direct costs are positive if and only if the coefficient on the
pollutant abatement expenditure variable is positive.  While the Joshi et al. (1997) study finds multipliers up to
12, Morgenstern et al. (1998) estimated  the multiplier to be 0.8, suggesting that the other direct costs are more
than offset by savings elsewhere in the production process.  This may indicate the joint cost aspect of some
environmental spending.  Of course, this analysis can only be done for fairly large aggregates of regulations, for
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on a single sector--and thus not involving many spillover impacts from one sector to another--
one can say on a priori grounds that general equilibrium effects are likely to be de minimis.7
In the 1970s and '80s the effects of some EPA regulations on plant closures and
unemployment were estimated, albeit crudely, as a part of the economic analysis--e.g.,
Effluent Guidelines for industrial water pollutant discharges.  In recent years, this style of
economic analysis has been generally superseded by more sophisticated analyses of the
welfare effects of regulations.  The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires that cost
estimates take into account transitional and indirect costs.  The cost analyses that we examine
were conducted prior to the growing interest in indirect cost, and thus do not generally include
these cost categories.8
Regulation.  The issue here is one of scale.  There may be good reasons why one
would want to estimate (i) the cost of  meeting an emission regulation at a particular plant,
(ii) the cost of an emission regulation for the entire country, or (iii) the cost of meeting an
ambient environmental quality objective.  As the scale increases, the uncertainties multiply,
and biases of estimation that were not evident at low levels of aggregation may become
important.
Our focus is on the cost estimates prepared by regulatory agencies for specific rules.
Since for every major rule (those with estimated annual costs in excess of $100 million)
agencies must prepare, under executive order, an RIA, also known as an "Economic
Analysis," containing an estimate of compliance costs of the alternatives considered, we
believe it is possible to make some judgments about the qualities of those estimates and give
at least a preliminary answer to the question of whether systematic biases exist.
Estimates.  In evaluating the quality and usefulness of a regulatory cost estimate, it is
important to keep in mind who is making the estimate and what its purpose is.  Before a
regulation is adopted, information about response options and costs may be asymmetrically
distributed; potentially regulated parties generally have better information about alternatives
for meeting requirements than regulatory agencies and advocacy groups.  At the same time,
however, industry cost estimates may be too high if firms do not fully anticipate cost-saving
measures they may discover once resources are directed to the task of compliance.9
The above-cited characteristics are clearly important for cost comparisons.  Even more
important, however, is the fact that credible ex ante/ex post comparisons cannot be made if the
relevant studies don't include the same components or don't refer to the same cost concepts.
For example, there are wide divergences in the ex post cost estimates of the low emission
                                               
7 A recent paper by Garber and Hammitt (1998) suggests that the public valuation of a firm's stock may be
reduced by the uncertainty associated with pollution liability, e.g. Superfund.
8 In any event, the number of plant closures or jobs lost as a result of environmental regulation is likely quite
small.  See Morgenstern et al. (1998b).
9 The hypothesis that environmental regulation triggers innovation that can offset some or all environmental
compliance costs was initially proposed by Porter (1991) and supported by Porter and van der Linde (1995).  For
a counter view see Jaffe et al. (1995) and Palmer et al. (1995).Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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vehicle (LEV) standard reported by Cackette (1998) and by Energy and Environmental
Analysis (1998), with the main difference revolving around the treatment of indirect costs.
There is a similar difference between two ex ante studies conducted by the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) and Sierra Research (1994).  For our purposes it is far more
important to match up studies with the same components than to answer the question of
whether the indirect costs belong in the estimate.10
Part of the difficulty of making cost comparisons is that actual outcomes can deviate
from predicted ones in so many ways that it is not easy to know what is comparable.
Consider the following example.  Suppose a cost estimate for a pollution abatement regulation
is to be prepared, based on an industry of 100 plants, with pre-regulatory emissions averaging
100 units per day.  Suppose further that the regulation calls for emissions to be reduced to 25
units per day at a per-plant cost of $200,000 per plant.  After implementation an industry trade
association does a survey to estimate the real cost of the regulation.  To simplify the
discussion we assume the baseline is identical to the ex ante estimate.  Some of the possible
outcomes are shown in Table 2.11
Table 2.  Cost estimation:  Some hypothetical cases
Alternative ex post outcomes Ex ante
Estimate 1 2 3 4 5
Number of plants 100 100 150 100 100 200
Emissions, pre-reg. 100 100 100 50 100 50
Emissions, post-reg. 25 25 25 25 50 25
Cost per plant $200k $100k $200k $200k $200 $100k
Aggregate cost $20M $10M $30M $20M $20M $20M
Emission reductions 7500 7500 11250 2500 5000 5000
Cost per emission unit $2666 $1333 $2666 $8000 $4000 $4000
The first of these five cases is an example of mis-estimation of per-plant costs.  The
next three are examples of various ways in which the "quantity"--i.e. emission reductions--of
regulatory output is different from prediction.
Case 1.  The cost per plant is overestimated by a factor of 2, while all other quantities
are estimated correctly, so that costs per emission unit as well as costs per plant are
overestimated.  We believe this is the situation that most observers have in mind when they
assert that costs are overestimated.
                                               
10 Smith et al. (1998) contains an interesting discussion of how long-run and short-run costs as well as marginal
and average costs are frequently confused in cost comparisons of the federal SO2 program.
11 Similar examples can be developed  for other types of regulation, although they may not be so easily
quantified.  For private land use regulation, for example, the three "quantity" elements of interest are the land
area involved and the range of permitted activities before and after regulation.  The cost of regulation is the
reduction in the market value of the land that would accompany implementation of the regulation.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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Case 2.  In this case, costs are estimated correctly on a per-plant basis, but an
underestimate of the number of plants means that the total costs exceed the estimate.  This
type of uncertainty would include the case where the total number of plants was known but
the number of plants with a given characteristic or technology is not.  This might apply, for
example, to landfill sites subject to corrective action requirements.
Case 3.  Again, costs per plant are estimated accurately, but the pre-regulatory
emissions are much less than originally thought.  This could be considered a case of accurate
estimation, because the costs per plant are estimated accurately and the environmental goal is
met.  Alternatively, it could be considered underestimation because the cost-effectiveness,
measured by the cost per unit emission reduction, is underestimated.
Case 4.  Here again costs per plant are estimated accurately, but the post-regulatory
emissions are not.  Ordinarily, this will not happen with command and control (CAC)
regulation because the post-regulation emissions are usually set by the regulation.  However,
it could occur, for example, if the regulation is not enforced successfully or if it calls for the
installation of a specific technology, rather than the achievement of an emission target.
Case 5.  In this case estimation errors are made in the number of plants, the pre-
regulatory emissions and the cost per plant.  Depending on one's evaluation criterion it is
possible to say that costs are overestimated (cost per plant), underestimated (cost per unit), or
predicted accurately (aggregate cost).
A word about economic incentives.  The foregoing discussion was written primarily
with traditional CAC regulation in mind.  Increasingly, though, modern environmental
regulation makes use of economic incentive (EI) approaches and, in fact, these are heavily
represented in our sample.  Ex ante estimation of outcomes is just as important for economic
incentives, but there are some differences in the uncertainties encountered.  Although
economic incentives can take a myriad of forms, we consider here only the pure quantity and
price instruments, i.e. marketable emission permits and emission fees.
In an marketable emission permit system, what is specified beforehand is the
aggregate emission reduction; plant-specific emission reductions are uncertain.12  The costs
are uncertain ex ante, both at the margin and in total, and market simulation models are used
to estimate ex ante costs.  Ex post, we observe a market-clearing permit price, which we take,
with some qualifications, as the marginal cost of abatement.
For an emission fee, the marginal cost--that is, the plant-level abatement cost--is
specified ex ante, and so there is very little uncertainty about what the marginal cost will be.
The uncertainty is in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or alternatively, the
demand curve for waste disposal services.  Thus the ex ante estimate that is of most interest is
the quantity of emission reductions.  If demand is more responsive than predicted, then a
given fee will result in more emission reductions than expected.  The total cost under this
                                               
12 This is in direct contrast to the typical CAC regulation, where one fixes beforehand the emission reductions
required from each plant, but the total emission reductions and the marginal cost of the regulation may not be
known with certainty.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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assumption will be greater or less than expected, depending on one's assumptions about the
shape of the demand curve.  For example, assuming linear demand, total cost will be greater
than anticipated and average cost will be as expected.  Despite the higher total cost, most
observers would regard this case as a pleasant surprise, for the higher total cost is more than
offset by the larger-than-expected emission reductions.
IV.   RESULTS
A combination of literature review and discussions with more than 50 environmental
experts were used to develop as large a sample of rules as possible for this study.  The basic
criteria for inclusion in the study were the existence of (a) an ex ante cost estimate developed
by a regulatory agency with substantial expertise in cost analysis, and (b) a relatively detailed
ex post estimate, typically (but not always) prepared by an academic or independent analyst.
At the state level we were only able to identify four rules, all from California, that met these
criteria.  Internationally, only three rules were included in our dataset.  It is interesting to note
that a number of the experts we consulted initially thought detailed evidence existed to
substantiate claims of cost overestimates or underestimates for particular rules.  However,
upon further investigation, we were unable to locate detailed ex post information for several
of the rules recommended by the experts.  In the end, 25 rules were selected for inclusion in
the study.13  We believe our list is reasonably comprehensive at least as far as federal health
and safety regulations in the U.S. are concerned.  We are less confident regarding state
regulations and not confident at all regarding regulations from other countries.  It is certainly
possible that other rules would qualify for inclusion in our dataset.  We welcome nominations
from our readers.
Problems of comparability among the different studies prevented us from performing a
strictly quantitative analysis of the ex ante/ex post comparisons.  Accordingly, we have
developed a qualitative approach.  We label an ex ante analysis as "accurate" if the ex post
estimated costs fall within the error bounds of the ex ante analysis of if they are between 25
percent higher and 25 percent lower than an ex ante point estimate.  If a regulation resulted in
lower than expected costs because of low compliance rates, we classify it as an example of
total cost overestimation.  Of course, such cases are also examples of benefits overestimation.
                                               
13 SO2 Phase I and Phase II are actually part of the same regulation.  However, because of large differences in
the number of facilities covered and the stringency of the emission requirements, we treat them as separate rules.
One reviewer pointed us to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's center-high-mounted
stomp lamp rule.  Actual costs for this rule were approximately double those forecast in the RIA.  We have
omitted it here because we focus on environmental and occupational health and safety regulations.  We also
omitted a number of smaller pesticide rules for which ex post studies are now in preparation because of their
small economic impact.
    In the case of CFCs, the initial RIA was significantly revised at the time the domestic rulemaking was
finalized.  However, since the initial RIA was most influential in the U.S. decision to sign the governing
international accord (the Montreal Protocol) we treat it as the relevant ex ante analysis.  Interestingly, the earlier
(1986) analysis generally overestimated costs while the revised analysis (1988) was more accurate.  See the
appendices.  For further discussion see (Hammitt, 1997).Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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Three outcomes are compared: the quantity of emission reductions achieved,  unit
pollution reduction costs, and total costs.  The quantity of emission reductions achieved
reflects the net effect of the quantity-related factors discussed in the preceding section, i.e.,
the number of firms or agents subject to regulation and the estimated emission rates with and
without regulation.  Overestimation of emission reductions implies that the regulators
achieved smaller reductions than expected.  This may arise because the reductions needed to
meet compliance were smaller than initially estimated.  Alternatively, the rule could suffer
from low compliance rates or from technical deficiencies (e.g. poor performance of
technology standards).
Unit pollution reduction cost outcomes generally refer to costs per unit of emissions
reduced (over the relevant range), although other margins can be important in individual
cases.  In pesticide regulation, for example, the relevant margin is costs per acre.  For the
inspection and maintenance (I/M) rule, costs can be usefully expressed both as costs per unit
of emissions or costs per vehicle.
Some of the studies cited did not make final judgments on whether costs were over- or
underestimated, and they usually did not decompose those judgments into the three outcomes
we examine here.  We found that in more than half the cases the same conclusion was reached
on both measures of cost, but there were some important divergences--enough, we hope, to
make our taxonomy of more than academic interest.
Table 3 summarizes the results for the individual rules.  A complete rule-by-rule
analysis is contained in Appendix A.  As shown, for each rule we provide the date the ex ante
estimate was made, together with a citation of the ex post study.
Table 3:  Case Study Results
Accurate Overestimate Underestimate Unable to Determine




Total Cost 5 12 2 6
Pollution reductions were overestimated in nine of the ex ante analyses examined and
underestimated in four of them.  In ten cases, the quantity predictions were judged to be about
right.  The per unit costs of regulations were even more likely to be overestimated; in twelve
cases per unit costs were overestimated, while they were underestimated in six cases.  Total
costs were overestimated for twelve rules and underestimated in just two cases and both were
comparatively small regulations--EPA's aldicarb ban and OSHA's powered platform
regulation.
Interestingly, these results vary somewhat by agency.  Neither EPA nor OSHA
evidenced a systematic bias in their ex ante estimates of the per unit costs of regulations.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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EPA overestimated per unit costs for three regulations, underestimated them for four
regulations and accurately estimated them for four.  Of the four EPA regulations that had per
unit cost overestimates, three were relatively small rules--coke ovens, dinoseb and aldicarb.
OSHA overestimated per unit costs for three rules, underestimated them for two and
accurately predicted them for three.  In contrast, state and foreign agencies were far more
likely to overestimate per unit costs than OSHA or EPA, doing so in six of the seven cases we
examined.
Both EPA and OSHA tended to overestimate rather than underestimate quantity
reductions.  EPA overestimated quantities in four of the ten regulations examined and
underestimated them in one.  The tendency was even more pronounced for OSHA; the agency
overestimated reductions in five of eight cases and underestimated then in none.  One of the
California rules had an underestimate of quantity reduction, one was accurate, and we were
unable to make a judgment for two others.  Two of the international regulations, both
congestion fees, underestimated quantity reductions.  The category was irrelevant for the third
international regulation.
The effect of the quantity mis-estimation appears to be important.  Both EPA and
OSHA had a tendency to overestimate the total costs, even though they did not tend to
overestimate per unit costs. In a number of cases, total costs were lower than expected
because the rules did not produce the anticipated compliance levels.  Although these are
examples of an overestimation of total cost, they are also examples of benefit overestimation
and the result does not imply that the regulation as envisioned was less expensive than
predicted.
An often discussed issue is whether the accuracy of cost estimates is improving over
time.  For the five federal rules enacted prior to the expansion of Executive Office oversight of
federal rulemaking in1981, two had overestimates of marginal cost, two had underestimates,
and the other was accurate.  For the thirteen post-1981 rules, four had overestimates, four had
underestimates and five were accurate.  Thus overall accuracy does not seem to be improving
over time.
In contrast, there does appear to be some improvement in the accuracy of pollution
reduction forecasts over time.  For the pre-1981 rules, four of five overestimated pollution
reduction; after 1981, five ex ante analyses overestimated quantities, one underestimated
them, while seven were accurate.  The improvement in quantity forecasting is reflected in the
total cost estimates.  All five pre-1981 ex ante analyses overestimated total costs.  The post-
1981 estimates overestimated total costs in five cases, underestimated them in two, and were
accurate in four cases.  While overestimates are still more likely than underestimates, a much
larger share of both total cost and quantity predictions have been accurate for recent rules.
One striking point that emerges from our dataset is the relatively large representation
of rules incorporating market-based incentives, which account for only a tiny fraction of total
regulatory activity in the U.S. and elsewhere.  By our count eight such rules (mostly largerHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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ones) are included in the data.14  For seven of these eight rules the agencies overestimated
costs, in some cases substantially.  For the eighth rule, which reduced the amount of lead
permitted in  gasoline, costs may also have been overestimated, but the data are inadequate to
make a clear case (Nichols, 1997).  Thus, although the sample is small, it appears that rules
that use an economic incentive approach are more likely to result in cheaper-than-expected
pollution reductions.
As to why these market-based rules are so heavily represented in our dataset.  Two
obvious answers strike us: (1) it is easier to obtain ex post information on rules involving
market-based incentives; and (2) economists, who conduct most of the ex post studies, have a
proprietary interest in the performance of economic incentives, much as a parent has a
proprietary interest in his child's school performance.  While we do not suggest this leads to a
bias in their assessments, it may create a greater interest in conducting the ex post studies in
the first place.
V.   DISCUSSION
Our examination of the case study results and the extant literature, together with
discussions with knowledgeable and experienced regulatory warriors at regulatory agencies
and elsewhere, generated numerous explanations of why ex ante cost estimates by regulatory
agencies might be systematically different from ex post calculations.  Perhaps we should
begin, however, by dismissing a hypothesis that appears to be refuted by the preponderance of
the evidence, namely, that regulatory agencies may "understate costs . . . because . . . their
self-interest lies in regulation," (OMB, 1998; for a similar argument, see Hahn, 1996).  We
take no position on whether bureaucrats engage in agency-aggrandizing behavior, but at
OSHA and the EPA, at least, our data does not support the notion f systematic
underestimation of regulatory costs.
We have grouped the remaining explanations into five categories.  The first is
technological innovation, considered by Goodstein and Hodges and others to be the primary
explanation for overestimation of costs.  But it is not the only possible explanation, and we
follow it with four others that seem to be important in at least some rules.  These include
"quantity errors," including both baseline and compliance issues, plus three explanations
associated with the procedural and methodological practices in rulemaking.  These hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive; each can be true for different rules, and in some cases may each
apply to the same rule.
1.   Technological Innovation
Under most circumstances regulatory cost estimates ignore the possibility of
technological progress.  As noted, regulators often have an obligation to identify a means for
firms to meet the regulation, a requirement that seemingly precludes the projection or
                                               
14 Leaded gas, CFCs, SO2 Phase I, SO2 Phase 2,, RECLAIM (NOx), RECLAIM (SOx), Singapore auto
licensing, and the Bergen toll ring.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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extrapolation of future costs or the expectation of cost declines.  Technical change is, after all,
notoriously difficult to predict; all we can say with some confidence, based on historical
experience, is that the cost of compliance will decline, but we cannot say at what rate.
In the case of SO2, scrubbing turned out to be more efficient and more reliable than
expected.  Ex ante estimates assumed SO2 removal efficiencies of about 80-85 percent
whereas typical performance has come in at around 95 percent.  Similarly, ex ante reliability
was assumed to be around 85 percent.  In fact, scrubbers have typically run in excess of 95
percent of the time.  Unanticipated opportunities have also arisen to use low sulfur coal in older
boilers.  Experiments and minor modifications at some plants revealed that low sulfur coal
could be blended with high sulfur coal up to a 40/60 mixture, compared to the 5/95 mixture
originally estimated.  Analysts have argued that these unanticipated innovations were driven by
competition from rail, some of which was driven by unanticipated innovation in that industry,
as well as by market opportunities, enhanced by the SO2 trading scheme which allowed firms
to profit from marginal reductions in emissions (Carlson et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1998).
The case of CFC phase-out provides another example where unanticipated innovation
led to lower costs.  When the original cost analysis was performed it was not anticipated that
HFC-134a could be substituted for CFC-12 in refrigeration.  However, as Hammitt (1997)
notes, "since 1991 most new U.S. automobile air conditioners have contained HFC134a (a
compound for which no commercial production technology was available in 1986) instead of
CFC-12" (page 13).  He cites a similar story for HCFC 141b and 142b, which are currently
substituting for CFC-11 in important foam-blowing applications.  In contrast, Hammitt notes
that "reductions in CFC-113 consumption have not relied as extensively on new compounds;
major reductions have been achieved by substituting other solvents and blends and by altering
production processes so that smaller quantities of solvent are required" (page 13).
In its review of OSHA standards, OTA (1995) cites a number of cases of low-cost
innovations not anticipated in the Agency's ex ante analysis.  For example, for vinyl chloride
"a significant production improvement not foreseen . . . was the proprietary "stripping"
process commercialized within a year of promulgation, which provided a substantially
improved means for producing PVC resin while reducing vinyl chloride exposures" (page 57).
For cotton dust, the OSHA analysis ". . . missed the sizeable extent to which dust control was
achieved as a by-product of an aggressive drive to modernize" (page 57).  However, OTA
also cites the case of occupational lead exposures where the anticipated technologies have not
materialized.  In that industry the emphasis has been on respiratory protection programs,
rather than on the expected engineering controls.  "Furthermore," OTA notes, "the 'new
technologies' envisaged at the time of rulemaking for compliance in the blast furnace area of
plants have not progressed; the single U.S. smelter using the Bergsoe process went bankrupt
in the mid-1980s, and hydrometallurgy still remains 'on the horizon' " (page 57).
A corollary of the technical change issue concerns the effect of time delays on the
costs of compliance.  Consider the case where a regulation is proposed and the target industry
protests, producing cost estimates suggesting that implementation would cause widespread
bankruptcies, raise product prices, and put people out of work.  The protests successfullyHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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cause the postponement of implementation of a regulation, and may work to reduce its
stringency.  Eventually, however, a regulation is promulgated, whereupon it is discovered that
the cost of compliance is much less than originally predicted.  Afterwards, the case is cited as
yet another example of wolf sightings from industry.  And yet, chances are that if the
regulation had been promulgated immediately the costs would have been more nearly what
was initially estimated.  In his study of CFCs, Hammitt (1997) notes that during the two year
period the rule was being developed "great attention was focused on the identification and
development of technological alternatives to CFCs" (page 11).
Environmentalists and analysts such as Goodstein and Hodges with some justice see
technological innovation as an important reason why costs are frequently overestimated.15
Innovation takes time, and perhaps the delays caused in part by the original cost estimates
were useful in allowing the industry time to find better and cheaper ways of meeting the
regulation.  Still, time is not always a decisive input; implementation of the I/M rule was
much delayed beyond its original 1992 deadline, and the costs were still substantially
underestimated.  The fact that technological progress is often responsible for lower than
expected costs does not necessarily imply that regulation "produces" technological
innovation.  The issue of "technological forcing" is separate from whether cost savings can be
attributed to unanticipated innovation.
2.   Quantity Errors: Baseline and Compliance Issues
A key determinant of overall cost is the amount of pollution reduction that results
from a regulation.  In many cases, prospective analyses have misestimated the emissions
reductions resulting from a rule.  As a result, total costs are different than expected, even
though the per-unit cost was forecasted accurately.  Frequently, regulations that have
produced lower pollution reductions than were expected are cited as examples of ex ante cost
overestimation.  However, in these cases, total benefits are smaller as well.  Society pays less,
and it gets less.
An inaccurate prediction of reductions can occur in one of two ways.  First, the ex ante
analysis can misestimate the baseline emissions that would exist without the regulation.  In
the case of OSHA's 1972 asbestos rule, the ex ante overestimate of the total cost of the
regulation is attributable to (erroneous) exposure assumptions (Mendeloff, 1988).  Similarly,
the ex ante analysis of OSHA's cotton dust rule significantly overestimated the number of
workers that would be affected by the regulation (Viscusi, 1992).  Analysts can also fail to
foresee developments affecting the quantity of emissions that must be reduced to comply with
a rule.  Estimates of the costs of the sulfur dioxide provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act failed
                                               
15 Sometimes technological innovation can be quite simple.  The NAS (1975) reports that the decision to set a
tolerance for hexachlorobenzene (HCB) was based on an estimate that at least 17,000 head of cattle would have
to be destroyed if the tolerance was set at 0.5 ppm.  However, after the 0.5 ppm tolerance was officially
established farmers took various steps to modify the impact of the decision on their cattle, and only three cows
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to foresee approximately two million tons of S02 reductions that would have occurred as a
result of railroad deregulation and other factors unrelated to the EPA regulations (Burtraw,
1998a).  Although in our dataset all the baseline problems involved overestimates, they could,
in principle, include underestimates as well.
Besides misestimating baseline emissions, the ex ante analysis can inaccurately predict
the regulation's effectiveness in achieving the desired pollution reduction.  In the case of
OSHA's 1976 coke oven standard, a retrospective analysis found that industry expenditures
had been far below expectations, but this was mainly due to incomplete compliance
(Mendeloff, 1988).  Similarly, the ban on the pesticide dinoseb resulted in a net savings after
the EPA granted an exemption allowing farmers to use paraquat on their crops.  OSHA's
occupational lead standard was met primarily through the use of protective gear for workers
rather than the engineering approach envisioned by the ex ante cost analysis.  Although
workers were protected, air lead levels in plants remained extremely high several years after
the regulation's promulgation (OTA, 1995).  In these cases, looking only at total costs is
misleading, because the high cost of the regulations resulted in compliance strategies that did
not produce the desired benefits.  Paradoxically, the underestimation of per-unit costs can lead
to the overestimation of total costs.
Even when compliance with a regulation is as expected, the regulations may,
nonetheless be ineffective in reducing pollution.  The ex ante analysis of EPA's vehicle
inspection and maintenance program slightly underestimated the costs of vehicle repairs but
dramatically overestimated the effectiveness of the repairs in reducing vehicle emissions
(Harrington et al., 1999).
3. Uncounted Cost Reductions Achieved During the Regulatory Review and Public
Comment Periods
Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) agencies are required to go through a
series of standard procedures including formal proposal, and public notice and comment,
before new regulations can become effective.  These procedures have become a bit of a ritual
in Washington, often spawning complex technical, economic and legal arguments between
agencies and the interested public.  Not surprisingly, rules are often modified between the
time they are proposed and the time they are published as final regulations in the Federal
Register.  What is less clear is whether the initial cost estimates are modified to fully reflect
the rule changes.
The conventional wisdom is that agencies propose relative stringent rules with the
tacit understanding that the final regulations will be softened somewhat in response to
comments from prospective regulatees.  Agency staff often justify such tactics as a means of
pressuring an industry reluctant to reveal internal cost or emissions information that is
necessary to set "reasonable" rules.  One recent paper documented that cost-saving rule
changes made during the regulatory development process occurred in all twelve of the rules
studied (Morgenstern and Landy, 1997).Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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Sometimes changes come in response to concerns raised by OMB.  Sometimes they
occur simply as a result of data or analysis generated within the regulatory agency but not
available at the time the rule was initially proposed.  And sometimes the cost-reducing
changes are made in response to industry–supplied data or as a result of industry lobbying.
One study of EPA's rulemaking process for effluent guidelines between 1972 and 1978
showed a marked asymmetry in the number and the nature of comments on the rules (Magat
et al., 1986).  The affected industries generated most of the comments on the regulations, and
virtually all the comments on their specific characteristics (costs predicted and emission
reductions required).  Environmental and public interest groups commented infrequently, and
when they did their comments were of a general nature, having more to do with the pace with
which regulations were being prepared, rather than the details of particular regulations.
Between the initial contractor document and the proposed regulation, and again between the
proposed and promulgated regulations, the effluent guidelines were loosened and cost
estimates were raised.
Particularly for large, complex rules, changes often involve the exclusion of certain
industrial or process subcategories, exclusion of specific waste streams, timing of
implementation, and record keeping requirements.  Some of these changes affect the quantity
of emission reductions required, other affect the cost per unit of emission reduction.
Examples of such changes can be found in the lead phasedown, CFC, and reformulated
gasoline regulations.
The key question is whether the rule changes are always or even systematically
captured in the final cost estimates issued by the agency.  Especially since rule changes often
occur at the very end of the process, sometimes just days before promulgation of the rule, in
many cases without the input of agency's economic experts, our observation is that many of
these changes are not captured in the final cost estimates.  Although we are not aware of any
formal study, the anecdotal evidence is fairly strong on this point.  The failure to capture all
the cost-saving changes means, almost by definition, that the agency's estimate will overstate
the true costs of the rule.
4.   Estimating Maxima Rather Than Means
There is a tendency, sometimes inadvertent and sometimes deliberate, for a regulatory
cost analysis to produce an estimate of the maximum cost, rather than the mean.  Inadvertent
estimation of the maximum cost may result from the agency's use of out-of-date information
on installed pollution control equipment.  If, for example, the agency data does not record the
most recent efforts to reduce emissions, the quantity of emissions required to meet a particular
goal might be overestimated.
Inadvertent estimation of the maximum cost may result from the agency's reliance on
the regulated industry for data.  The industry is the source, directly or indirectly, of most of
the data used to support cost estimates as well as the possible improvements in firm
performance that might be called forth by new regulation.  Sometimes, as in the recently-
concluded multi-media rulemaking for the pulp and paper industry, the EPA seeks theHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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cooperation of the main trade association--in this case the American Forest and Paper
Association--which may, in turn, solicit cost data from its members or serve as a conduit for
an Agency-designed questionnaire.  In addition, it is noteworthy that EPA cost studies are
frequently done by outside contractors, who hire industry experts (often ex-employees of the
industry) to make estimates.  If the agency relies on cost and compliance information from the
industry, then agency cost estimates might be subject to the same biases as industry estimates.
The industry also has opportunities during the regulatory process to produce cost
estimates even when unsought by the regulators.  For example,  trade associations sometimes
hire contractors to conduct their own cost studies, as when the auto industry retained Sierra
Research to estimate the cost of meeting the LEV and ULEV standards.16  Regulators may
harbor skepticism of these estimates, but they still must be addressed in the rulemaking
process and some explanation given for major disparities in estimates.  The mere existence of
such studies may exert upward pressure on regulators' cost estimates.
While the industry may be motivated by strategic considerations, overestimates of
costs may also result from firms' unwillingness to devote resources to figuring out the best
way to comply with a proposal that may or may not be the final rule.  Asked "what will it
cost?" a firm's analyst may respond with the cost of an "off-the-shelf" compliance technology.
Further study may reveal that compliance cost can be cut substantially through clever
engineering that takes advantage of particular characteristics of the production technology.  In
this case firms are not employing strategic behavior, but just choosing not to expend resources
in advance of a final regulation in determining how compliance could be achieved at
minimum cost.  This approach might also be desired by the firm for reasons of prudence.
There may also be occasions when the regulator will quite deliberately estimate a
maximum cost, for example, if the costs of compliance are thought to be modest, if
underestimation of costs risks embarrassment, or if court challenge seems likely.  It is
standard practice in EPA's Effluent Guidelines Division, for example, to attempt to provide an
upper bound for a compliance cost estimate.17  Even if the applicable statute only permits
economic factors to enter in an indirect manner, underestimation may jeopardize the legal
standing of the rule.18
In addition, a good deal of health and safety regulation is "technology-based," which
means that the regulator identifies an emission-reducing technology and then writes the
regulation so that the identified technology can meet it.  The language used in industrial
pollution control statutes makes clear the importance of feasibility: "Best Practicable
Technology," "Best Available Technology Economically Achievable," "Best Conventional
Technology" (Clean Water Act); "Best Available Control Technology," "Lowest Achievable
                                               
16 For pesticides, EPA's analysts often contact a sample of county extension agents to estimate the acreage of
crops planted in an affected crop plus the availability and effectiveness of alternative pesticides.
17 Personal communication, William Anderson and William Wheeler, Effluent Guidelines Division, June 30,
1998.
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Emission Rate" (Clean Air Act).  Note the emphasis on technology that is available and
achievable, words that impose a responsibility on the Agency to identify a technology in use
that can meet the standard the Agency wishes to impose.  The cost estimate is, of course,
based on the designated technology.  Regulated firms are free to meet the standard by any
method, and they will use the identified technology only if its costs are lowest of the
alternatives.  Thus the agency is once again estimating a maximum cost.
5.  Asymmetric Correction of Errors of Estimation
Estimation of costs is full of uncertainties in the best of circumstances, and it is
understandable that such estimates would be subject to large errors.  These errors come not
only from an understandable failure to anticipate technological change, but from equally
understandable errors in characterizing the universe of firms or agents likely to be affected by
the regulation, as well as the cost and effectiveness of the compliance technologies employed.
This is true even if the agency analysis is free of the errors noted above.  In the absence of
bias, of course, we would expect costs to be underestimated as often as it is overestimated.
We have already discussed how internal and external pressures as well as new information
can cause the regulation itself to change after the cost estimate is prepared.  The cost estimate
itself can also be changed if errors are pointed out
However, gross underestimates of costs are more likely to be brought to the regulator's
attention by worried members of the regulated community.  The communication of such
concerns to regulators can cause a change to the regulation or the cost estimates, causing low-
ball cost estimates tend to be eliminated or transformed into something more "reasonable."
No corresponding pressures can be found for gross overestimates, which causes an apparent
upward bias in regulatory cost estimates.  It is quite likely, for example, that the error in the
analysis of OSHA's formaldehyde regulation, which resulted in a cost overestimate, would
have been corrected if it had led to an underestimate of costs.
VI.   CONCLUSIONS
The debate over whether the costs of environmental regulatory programs are under- or
over-estimated is really two debates, and it is important not to confuse them.  One issue is
whether all the cost elements are being included in the estimates.  Many observers argue that
important cost elements are being left out, and if they were included they might swamp the
costs that are now included.  These omissions include the diverted management attention and
the innovations that weren't made because of the time and resources devoted to complying
with environmental regulations.  These omissions also include the general equilibrium effects,
the adjustments that ripple through the economy when resources are diverted from one use to
another.  Not only are such cost elements difficult to measure, they are also virtually
impossible to attach to individual regulations.  Thus it is no surprise to find that those who
argue that important costs are ignored in regulatory decision-making tend also to be thoseHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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who point to the costs of environmental regulation in general, rather than to the costs of
individual regulation.
The second issue is the one we have concentrated on in this paper: whether the cost
elements that are estimated during regulatory procedures contain systematic errors, and if so,
what the implications are for regulatory policy.  Unlike the first issue described above, this issue
is amenable to empirical test.  To resolve it, some experts call for more intensive scrutiny of the
procedures used by regulatory agencies to collect information, choose rulemaking alternatives,
and evaluate costs.  Hahn (1996), for example, argues that "without a detailed evaluation of
each regulatory analysis and Federal Register preamble, it is difficult to say how individual
analyses are likely to be biased" (page 224).  Close analysis of rulemaking procedures and the
documents produced to support them is certainly important and useful work.
Close study of individual rulemaking analyses, however, is not sufficient to determine
whether RIAs accurately predict the realized direct costs of regulations.  What is needed in
addition is a systematic comparison of ex ante cost estimates generated by RIAs to the ex post
assessments of the same rules.  That is what we attempt to provide in this paper.  Our review
of over two dozen ex ante/ex post comparisons indicates that ex ante estimates of total cost
have tended to exceed actuals.  We find this to be true of 12 of the 25 rules in our data set,
while for only 6 were the ex ante estimates too low.  Since the overestimates occur more
frequently in the larger rules, the dollar-weighted predominance of overestimates would be
even higher.  For federal rules the overestimation of total costs is often due to errors in the
quantity of required emission reductions which, in turn, is driven by both baseline and
compliance issues.  In these cases, the ex ante overestimate of total costs is accompanied by
an ex ante overestimate of total benefits (pollution reductions).  At least for EPA and OSHA
rules, overestimation of per unit abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation.
On the other hand, overestimation of per unit costs seems to occur consistently for those rules
that employ economic incentive mechanisms.
We find numerous instances in the case studies where actual compliance costs are
lower than predicted costs because of unanticipated use of new technology.  Thus the case
studies support the usual explanation for regulatory cost overestimates--unanticipated
technological innovation.  We might further ask whether there are particular features of rules
that encourage innovation, and here we note the importance of flexibility--especially
regarding when, how, where and by whom emission reductions are to be made.  The more
flexible rules are, the more difficult it is for regulators or anyone else to anticipate the
technical responses to regulation and what the costs might be.  Of course, the most flexible
emission reduction policies involve substantial use of economic incentives, and we note that
for all the economic incentive policies in our sample the cost was overestimated or the
quantity of emission reductions was underestimated.  In fact,  the disproportionately large
share of market-based rules in our data raises concerns that we may have inadvertently
selected rules especially prone to cost overestimation.
Unanticipated innovation is not the only explanation for overestimates of direct
regulatory costs.  The case studies, as well as discussions with regulators and academicHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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experts, also generated support for four other hypotheses: quantity errors (which may imply
that benefits are overestimated), changes in the regulation after the cost estimate is prepared,
use of maximum cost estimates, and asymmetric error correction.  Some of these
explanations, such as the tendency to estimate maximum costs, also support the notion that
direct costs are overestimated.  However, other explanations imply that the implemented
regulation is not the one for which the cost estimate is prepared.  In that case, the regulation is
not the bargain it might appear to be just looking at the cost comparison.
In any case, the tendency to overestimate compliance costs seems to arise from both
the pressures of regulatory politics and certain practices of cost estimation and rulemaking.
Our data set is too small to sort out the relative importance of these hypotheses, or of others
that did not suggest themselves to us.  To gain further insights into the biases of regulatory
cost estimates, we believe it is critical that the universe of credible ex post studies be
expanded.  To sort out the relative significance of these and other possible explanations of
cost mis-estimation, it is also important to study more closely the rulemaking and cost
estimation process, as Hahn and others have recommended.
Some may see these findings as undermining the value of rigorous ex ante analysis of
the costs of regulation.  We strongly disagree with such an interpretation as it ignores the
useful role that cost estimation can serve in the rulemaking process.  Cost estimation helps
regulators conduct a disciplined process of thinking through the full ramifications of a rule.
As noted earlier, findings of high cost can also motivate a search for regulatory options that
lower costs, often at little or no reduction in benefits.
It should come as no surprise that ex ante estimates can be useful in the rulemaking
process without necessarily providing good predictions of costs ex post.  After all, the cost
estimate is usually an input to the rulemaking decision, not an output intended to be judged on
its own merits.  Still, there is much to be said for making the final estimate as accurate as
possible.  In order to assure that the public has the Agency's "best estimate" of the regulation,
there are some fairly simple changes to cost estimation procedures that could be adopted.
Since a number of statutes appear to encourage the development of cost estimates that reflect
a maximum rather than a mean, regulatory agencies could issue a "best estimate" along with
the statutorily preferred cost estimate.  Likewise, they could ensure that any changes in the
rule made subsequent to publication of the cost estimate would be manifest in a revised cost
estimate.19  Changes of this sort this would not only provide more reliable information to the
public but they would also serve to enhance the credibility--and hence the usefulness--of cost
estimates in the regulatory process.  Indeed, discovering how and when to adjust ex ante
estimates provides the strongest possible justification for more credible ex post studies--a
research activity that we believe merits greater emphasis.
                                               
19 Currently, revised cost estimates are prepared for some rules but not others.25
Appendix A:  Summary of Case Studies
Date of ex ante
study
Source for ex post
comparison
Quantity reduction Unit  cost of
pollution reduction
Total Cost Comments
Leaded Gas 1985 Nichols (1997) Underestimated Accurate Accurate Costs of the rule were never reestimated.
The more rapid than expected phase-out of
leaded gasoline suggests that costs may
have been lower than expected.




After dinoseb was banned, EPA granted
emergency exemptions to peanut farmers,
allowing them to use paraquat.  Paraquat
was more cost effective than dinoseb, so the
result was a net savings.
1986 Hammitt (1997) Accurate Overestimated Overestimated Subsequent regulation backed by treaty and
legislation expanded the reductions beyond
those initially forecast.
CFCs 1988 Accurate Accurate Accurate Estimates released after the signing of the
Montreal Protocol contained lower forecast
costs – one scenario was approximately
correct; the other was an underestimate.
Aldicarb 1988 Gianessi and
Phillips (1998)
Overestimated Underestimated Underestimated Although EPA accurately forecast farmers’
behavior following the ban, the substitutes
used were far less effective than predicted.
EPA reinstated aldicarb’s use in some
locations.
SO2 Phase I 1990 Smith et al (1998),
Carlson et al (1998)
Accurate Overestimated Accurate The effect of rail deregulation allowing
more low sulfur coal to move East was not
adequately  accounted for.  Realized
emissions have been lower than expected.
However, the predicted total costs of Phase I
were correct because of  the high capital
costs of extensive Phase I scrubbing and
contributions to the bank.
SO2 Phase II 1990 EPRI (1997),
Carlson et al (1998)
Overestimated Overestimated- Overestimated Recent modeled estimates indicate that costs
for Phase II were overstated.  Emissions in
Phase II are expected to be higher than
initially forecast because of Phase I
banking.26
Appendix A:  Summary of Case Studies  (cont'd)
Date of ex ante
study
Source for ex post
comparison
Quantity reduction Unit  cost of
pollution reduction
Total Cost Comments
NOx (Clean Air Act) 1990 Burtraw (1998b)) Accurate Accurate Accurate The program did not involve a fixed
emissions cap; instead it involved a reduction
in the emission rate.   The agency
overestimated electricity demand growth and
therefore overestimated baseline emissions.
Although costs were about accurate, there
was a resulting modest (less than 25%)
overstatement of total emission reductions.
I/M 1992 Harrington et al.
(1999)
Overestimated Underestimated ? Vehicle repair not as effective as anticipated
in achieving emissions reductions; therefore
realized reductions were lower than
expected.  Ex ante study envisioned
nationwide program applying to 56 million
vehicles.  So far program has only been
implemented in four states.
Reformulated Gas 1993 Anderson (1997) Overestimated Accurate Overestimated* EPA’s predicted cost differentials appear to
be reasonably accurate for the largest
markets.  Public concern about health effects




1993 Graham (1997) Accurate Underestimated ? Preliminary indications are that EPA rule has
contributed to the trend of  increasing coke
imports.
Asbestos 1972 Priest, Bengali
(1981), cited in
Mendeloff (1988)
Overestimated Accurate Overestimated Ex ante forecast overestimated initial
exposure levels.
Vinyl Chloride 1974 OTA (1995) Accurate Overestimated Overestimated Estimates of direct costs are 20-25% of those
predicted.  Price increases are observed, but
even if these costs are included the ex ante
was an overestimate.
Coke Ovens (OSHA) 1975  Arthur Anderson &
Co. (1979),  cited in
Mendeloff (1998)
Overestimated Underestimated Overestimated* Although total expenditures were far below
those predicted by OSHA, this was in large
part due to incomplete compliance
Cotton Dust 1976 Viscusi (1992)
OTA (1995)
Overestimated Overestimated Overestimated Ex ante estimate overstated the number of
workers affected by the regulation.  In
addition, after promulgation the textile
industry modernized in response to foreign
competition, enabling dust control to be
achieved at a lower cost.27
Appendix A:  Summary of Case Studies  (cont'd)
Date of ex ante
study
Source for ex post
comparison
Quantity reduction Unit  cost of
pollution reduction
Total Cost Comments
Occupational Lead 1978 OTA (1995) Overestimated Underestimated Overestimated* Al though costs were lower than predicted by
OSHA, exposure reductions were achieved
through hygiene and worker protective gear,
as opposed to the engineering approaches the
agency envisioned.  The collapse of lead
prices after 1979 resulted in a shakeout of the
industry, further lower total compliance
costs.  As of 1994 lead exposure levels still
exceeded permissible exposure levels of the
regulation.
Ethylene Oxide 1984 OTA (1995) Accurate Accurate Accurate Cost slightly higher due in part to
overcompliance motivated by long-term
exposure and liability concerns.
Formaldehyde 1987 OTA (1995) Accurate Overestimate Overestimate Ex ante estimate overlooked important
substitute.
Powered Platforms 1989 OTA (1995) Overestimate Accurate Underestimate Rule was supposed to generate cost savings.
AN economic downturn in the construction
industry prevented the total projected savings
from being realized.
LEV 1990, 1994 Cackette (1998) ? Overestimate ? Ex post survey revealed slight overestimate.
Reformulated Gas (CA) 1991, 1996 Cackette (1998) ? Overestimate ? Per gallon costs were about half those
estimated by CARB. Ambient monitoring
detected significant improvements in air
quality.
RECLAIM (NOx) 1993 SCAQMD (1998) Underestimate Overestimate Overestimate Price of NOx trading credits significantly
lower than forecast.  Emissions also lower.




1975 Hau (1992) Underestimate Overestimate ? Licensing program attempted to reduce
morning congestion in central business
district. Program was expected to reduce
traffic 25-30%.  Traffic dropped between
one-third and one-half.  The program
exacerbated congestion in other areas of the
city.28
Appendix A:  Summary of Case Studies  (cont'd)
Date of ex ante
study




Unit  cost of
pollution reduction
Total Cost Comments
Bergen Toll Ring 1986 Hau (1992) Underestimate Overestimate ? Traffic was projected to fall by 3%; fell 6-7%
in the first year.
Ontario Water 1988 OMOE (1996) Accurate Accurate Accurate Rule covered nine major industrial sectors.
Although the total cost prediction was
accurate, the estimates for individual sectors
varied widely.
*Compliance level substantially different than envisioned in the RIAHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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APPENDIX B:  DESCRIPTION OF CASES
Regulation:  EPA Phase-out of leaded gas -- 47 FR 49322
Source:  Albert Nichols.  "Lead in Gasoline," in Economic Analysis at EPA: Assessing
Regulatory Impact" in Morgenstern (1998)
The costs of the rule were predicted to be around $600 million year in increased refining costs
(1983$).  There has not been a retrospective analysis of the rule's costs but evidence indicates
that EPA's analysts correctly forecast the costs or even overestimated them.  First, refiners
were able to reduce production of leaded gasoline much more quickly than anticipated.
Second, the price differential between leaded and unleaded gasoline narrowed considerably
after promulgation, in accordance with EPA's analysis.  A retrospective analysis is
complicated by the fact that world oil prices plummeted following the rule, swamping any
effect that the regulation may have had.
Regulation:  EPA 1986 dinoseb ban
Source:  Gianessi and Phillips (1998)
The retrospective study looked at the effect of the dinoseb ban on peanut farmers.  In 1986,
the EPA announced the emergency suspension of all registrations of dinoseb.  The EPA
predicted that the ban would result in a loss of about $70 million in the first year due to
reduced peanut yields.  Following the ban, the agency granted emergency exemptions for
farmers in several southern states, allowing them to apply paraquat to their peanut crops.
Because paraquat was more cost-effective than dinoseb, there was a cost-savings of around
$400,000/year.  While this eliminated the costs of the ban, it also affected the benefits;
increased paraquat use has environmental costs.
Regulation:  CFC Phaseout
Source:  James K. Hammitt (1997)
Ex ante estimates come from two sources: a RAND report published in May 1986 (16 months
before the signing of the Protocol) and an EPA RIA published in August 1988 (11 months after
the Protocol).  The period between the two studies was one of intense technological research.
Hammitt takes the total market price as an estimate of the marginal cost of the consumption
restriction.  As CFC consumption declined in response to limits placed on the number of
permits issued, the total market price increased, tracing out the marginal cost of control.
RAND estimated costs separately for CFC 11, 12, and 113 and provided two estimates,
representing upper and lower bounds on expected reduction in CFC consumption.  ExpectedHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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reductions were reported as a function of price.  At prices of $6-8/kg, consumption of both
CFC-11 and CFC-12 were about 40 percent to 60 percent below the forecasted baseline.  On
the other  hand, CFC-113 was accurately forecasted especially for modest and large
reductions.  In the aggregate, the costs of the phase-out were overestimated by RAND.
EPA provided two scenarios: slow and fast implementation.  EPA underestimated control
costs, although the pessimistic estimate was reasonably accurate for 40 percent - 60 percent
reductions achieved in 1990 and 1991.  Hammitt attributes some of EPA's underestimate to
the accelerated phase-out brought about by amendments to the Protocol.  The increased
phase-out meant that the reductions happened much sooner than expected, before new low-
cost technologies could be introduced.
Regulation:  EPA's 1988 aldicarb ban
Source:  Gianessi and Phillips (1998)
In 1988, the EPA estimated that the total costs of a complete aldicarb ban would equal $135
million.  About 15 percent of total aldicarb applications were applied to potatoes.  Although
EPA accurately predicted the responses farmers made to the ban, they overestimated the
effectiveness of substitutes in controlling potato pests.  The resulting spread of leaf roll virus
may have by itself led to yield losses in excess of $100 million.  EPA reinstated aldicarb's use
in some locations.
Regulation:  Title IV of the Clean Air Act -- SO2 reductions (Phase I)
Source:  Carlson et al. (1997); Smith, Platt and Ellerman (1998)
The sulfur dioxide provisions of the Clean Air Act are often cited as an example of dramatic
ex ante overestimation of the costs of environmental regulation.  Claims that  S02 allowances
are trading for less than one-tenth of the predicted price are overstated, according to Smith,
Platt and Ellerman (1998) and Burtraw (1998a).  Burtraw places the correct comparison at a
forecast price of $250/permit and a realized price of around $125/permit.  There are two ex
post studies that estimate total costs of the regulation.  Carlson et al. is an econometric study
that estimates total annual Phase I costs of the program in 1995 were $832 million in 1995
dollars and marginal costs and marginal costs of $180 per ton of abatement.  Ellerman et al. is
a survey that places 1995 annual costs at $726 million.  There are a number of ex ante studies
that can be used for comparison; ICF (1990) is the study most relevant to the passage of
Title IV and also represents the low end of the range of cost estimates for the regulation.  ICF
(1990) predicted annual costs of between $450 million and $860 million and marginal costs of
$199-226/ton.  The lower than predicted marginal costs are explained by technological
improvements in scrubbing, innovations allowing for greater use of low-sulfur coal, andHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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railroad deregulation that substantially reduced the costs of transporting low-sulfur Western
coal.  These factors also contributed to a substantial reduction in baseline emissions.  Smith,
Platt, and Ellerman report that there has been greater "overcompliance" (excess SO2
reductions) than had been expected prior to the regulation.
Regulation:  Title IV of the Clean Air Act -- SO2 reductions (Phase II)
Source:  Carlson et al. (1997); EPRI (1997)
Phase II of the program begins in the year 2000, so new estimates are not ex post but revised
ex ante.  ICF (1990) forecast annual costs of $1.6-5.3 billion/year for 2010 (full
implementation of Phase II), with marginal costs of $564-740 per ton.  Carlson et al.'s
preferred estimate is $1.0 billion a year and a marginal cost of $291/ton.  EPRI's updated costs
for the program range from $1.1-1.8 billion a year and marginal costs of $276-498 per ton.
Higher than expected overcompliance in Phase I implies that Phase II reduction between 2000
and 2010 will be less than expected due to banking.
Regulation:  Title IV of the Clean Air Act -- NOx reductions
Source:  Burtraw (1998b)
The program did not involve a fixed cap.  Although the ex ante estimate overestimated
baseline emissions, quantity reductions and costs were accurately forecasted.
Regulation:  Enhanced I/M (57 FR 52950, November 5, 1992)
Source:  Harrington, McConnell, and Ando (1999)
An estimated 56 million vehicles in "serious" and worse nonattainment areas were to
implement the "high option" program, consisting of centralized IM-240 tests,
evaporative emission tests and repair of all 83 and later model-year vehicles.  In 1995
EPA was prevented by Congress from requiring centralized testing, and the states were
allowed much greater latitude in coming up with a substitute program.  Only five states
have so far implemented the IM-240 test, usually with weaker emission standards than
examined by EPA in the RIA.  On a per-vehicle basis, the costs (including testing cost,
fuel savings, motorist inconvenience cost and repair cost) of the program slightly
exceed the ex ante estimates, but the emission reductions achieved are much smaller.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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Regulation:  EPA 1994 reformulated gas regulation -- 59 FR 7716
Source:  Robert Anderson and Richard Rykowski (1998); "Reformulated Gasoline" in
Morgenstern (1998)
The EPA RIA predicted an average 2.3 cents per gallon increase in refinery costs for
reformulated gasoline.  In 1995, the price differentials were slightly higher than predicted due to
a temporary increase in methanol prices.  It appears that EPA correctly forecast the price
increases for the larger markets.  In June 1998, the price differential in California was 2.0 cents.
For New York it was 2.3 cents and for Texas it was 1.8 cents.  Prior to the regulation there were
fears about a shortage of RFG but there was an initial glut.  A number of states opted out of the
program responding to consumer concerns about cost and the health effects of MTBE.
Regulation:  EPA Coke Oven standard
Source:  Graham (1997)
Graham did not provide a retrospective reestimation of the total costs of the rule.  Anecdotal
evidence shows that the technological modifications envisioned by the EPA have not taken
place.  Instead, there is evidence the rule has contributed to continuing the trend of increasing
coke imports.  As Graham notes, "the net effect on worldwide emissions from coke
production is not likely to be favorable, although residents living near U.S. coke plants will
have cleaner air to breathe."
Regulation:  OSHA 1972 Asbestos Standard -- 37 FR 3155
Source:  Mendeloff (1988)
Mendeloff reports that a 1974 reanalysis by an independent academic suggested that OSHA's
consultant had doubled the true cost of compliance with OSHA's 2-fiber standard because the
consultant had assumed that exposures were considerably higher than they really were.  The
reanalysis placed the annual costs at $75 million in 1970 dollars.  A retrospective study
conducted in 1980 estimated that costs were in line with the academic estimate.
Regulation:  OSHA 1974 Vinyl Chloride Standard –39 FR 35890
Sources:  Office of Technology Assessment (1995), Mendeloff (1988)
Mendeloff's review describes the vinyl chloride standard as providing "the most blatant
overestimates of compliance costs."  OSHA's consultant argued that the proposed 1 ppm
standard was infeasible, but placed the costs of less stringent standards at around $100 million
a year in 1974 dollars.  OSHA went ahead and promulgated the 1 ppm standard.  A subsequentHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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study by researchers from the Wharton School of Business put compliance costs for the 1 ppm
standard at around $20 million a year.  According to OTA, the most credible ex ante estimates
for the 1 ppm standard came from OSHA's technical consultant who placed total costs of the
rule at $1 billion in 1974 dollars.  OTA's retrospective analysis estimated total spending to be
around a quarter of this amount--$228 million to $278 million.
Regulation:  OSHA Coke Oven standard -- 41 FR 46741
Source:  Mendeloff (1988)
OSHA's contractor estimated a range for the standard of $200 million to $1 billion in 1975
dollars.  No retrospective study has looked at the total costs of the regulation but anecdotal
evidence points to an ex ante overestimate of total costs.  A survey conducted by Arthur
Anderson for the Business Roundtable obtained information from three steel firms that were
affected by the regulation.  OSHA's consultant had predicted that the three firms would spend
around $91 million on the regulation; the survey found that they had spent only $5-7 million.
However, Mendeloff states that a major reason for these low expenditures was incomplete
compliance with the regulation.
Regulation:  OSHA 1978 Cotton Dust standard -- 43 FR 27350
Sources:  Office of Technology Assessment (1995), Viscusi (1992)
OSHA's RIA placed the textile manufacturing sector's cost at $280.3 million a year in 1982
dollars.  OTA's retrospective study estimated actual spending to be approximately a third of
this amount--$82.8 million annually.  Viscusi breaks out the costs into total capital costs and
annual operating costs.  The prospective analysis predicted total capital costs of $1.4 billion
and annual operating  costs of $173 million (1982 $).  A retrospective analysis placed capital
costs at $269 million and operating costs at $29 million/year.  A key reason that costs were
overestimated according to OTA was that the textile industry modernized in the 1980s in
response to foreign competition, making it less costly to achieve dust control.  In addition,
Viscusi cites some technical errors in the original analysis, such as overestimating the number
of plants and workers affected by the standard.
Regulation:  OSHA 1978 Occupational Lead -- 43 FR 52952
Source:  Office of Technology Assessment (1995)
OSHA estimated that meeting the 50 mg/m
3 standard would cost a total of $150 million for
capital spending and 1.6 cents/lb for operating/maintenance expenses (1992 dollars).
According to OTA, actual spending through 1994 amounted to only $20 million for capitalHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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expenses and between 0.5 and 1.0 cents/lb for operating and maintenance.  Exposure
reductions were achieved through hygiene and worker protective gear, as opposed to the
engineering approaches the agency envisioned.  The collapse of lead prices after 1979
resulted in a shakeout of the industry, further lowering total compliance expenditures.  As of
1994, air lead levels still exceeded the permissible exposure levels of the regulation.
Regulation:  OSHA 1984 Ethylene Oxide standard -- 49 FR 25734
Sources:  Office of Technology Assessment (1995)
Regulation affected a half-dozen industries; retrospective study examined hospital sector, the
industry with the vast majority of exposed workers.  OSHA's RIA predicted total compliance
costs to be $23.7 million annual in 1982 dollars.  OTA's retrospective assessment found total
spending to have modestly exceeded this estimate, but this was due mainly to overcompliance
motivated by long-term health concerns and managers' fears of possible future tort liability
claims.
Regulation:  OSHA 1987 Formaldehyde standard -- 52 FR 46168
Sources:  Office of Technology Assessment (1995)
The RIA estimated the compliance costs of the metal foundries sector to be $11.4 million
annually in 1987 dollars.  OTA estimates that actual costs were about half--$6.0 million.  A
key reason for this is that the RIA overlooked the possibility of industry using already existing
low-formaldehyde substitutes instead of more expensive technological solutions, such as
increasing ventilation or enclosure approaches.
Regulation:  OSHA 1989 Powered Platforms safety standard --54 FR 31408
Sources:  Office of Technology Assessment (1995)
Powered platforms are used in the construction of high-rise buildings.  OSHA's amended
regulation allowed for greater flexibility in choosing technology and therefore was expected
to generate cost savings of about $1.7 million a year in 1989 dollars.  A downturn in the
construction industry meant that the anticipated cost savings were not realized in full.  As a
result, OTA estimates the savings fell to a best case of  $600,000/year or as low as a net cost
of $400,000/year.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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Regulation:  Low Emission Vehicles -- California Air Board
Source:  Presentation by CARB's Tom Cackette, July 1998
In 1990, CARB predicted fleet average incremental cost for LEV technology to be $170.  By
1994, the number had fallen to $114 (compared to an industry estimate of $788).  According to
a survey conducted by CARB in 1998, the actual incremental cost of LEV technology was $83.
Regulation:  Reformulated Gasoline in California -- CA Air Board
Source:  Presentation by CARB's Tom Cackette, July 1998.
In 1991, CARB predicted that reformulated gas would lead to a price increase of 12-17
cents/gallon.  In 1996, CARB predicted the differential to be 10 cents/gallon.  In 1998, the
actual differential was 5.4 cents a gallon.
Regulation:  NOx trading in California
Source:  South California Air Quality Management District (1998)
The prices of NOx trading credits are significantly lower than projected.  In October 1993, the
AQMD predicted that NOx Reclaim Trading Credits (RTCs) would trade for $11,257 in 1999.
In 1997, 1999 prices for 1999 credits were around $1,800.  Credits were distributed with the
objective of matching the emission reductions that would have been achieved under a
command and control policy.  Realized emission have been below those projected under
command and control.
Regulation:  SO2 trading in California
Source:  South California Air Quality Management District (1998)
The prices of SO2 RTCs were also overestimated but not as dramatically as for NOx.
According to the 1993 AQMD predictions, SO2 RTCs were projected to cost $2,970 in 1998
and $2,882 in 1999.  In 1997, 1998 and 1999 RTCs were trading for $1100 and $2400,
respectively.
Regulation:  Singapore Area Licensing Scheme
Source:  Hau (1992)
The program limited access to an area of the Central Business District (CBD) during morning
rush hour.  Automobile owners were required to purchase a special sticker in order to enterHarrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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the CBD between 7:30 and 9:30 a.m.  Taxis, buses, carpools and commercial vehicles were
exempt from the rule, which was expected to reduce overall traffic volume by 25 percent.
Motor car traffic dropped by three-quarters, while overall traffic volume dropped by between
a one-third and one- half, reflecting a shift to the exempt classes of automobiles as well as
motorcycles.  Several vehicles were taken off the exempt list and charges for motorcycles
were introduced.  Increased congestion was observed in other parts of the city, as motorists
rerouted their commutes.
Regulation:  Bergen Toll Ring
Source:  Hau (1992)
Following Singapore, Bergen, Norway was the second city to charge motorists for entering
the Central Business District (CBD).  Traffic was expected to drop 3 percent, but dropped 6-7
percent in the first year.  Car occupancy increased slightly; it was not clear whether there was
a shift toward public transport.
Regulation:  Water monitoring in Ontario
Source:  Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Energy (1995)
As part of the Municipal-Industrial Strategy for Abatement, regulations were promulgated
that required intensive monitoring of industrial wastewater in nine major industrial sectors.
The total cost of the monitoring program was predicted to be $43.6 million in 1988 Canadian
dollars.  The estimate was thought to be accurate +/- 20 percent.  A retrospective study
conducted in 1996 found the costs to be $50.9 million, a difference of about 14 percent.
Although the total cost prediction was accurate, the estimates for individual sectors varied
widely.  For example, the costs to the metal mining sector were overestimated by about 248
percent, while the costs to the electric power sector were almost twice as large as predicted.Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson  RFF 99-18
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